Corrupted GOOSE Detectors: Anomaly Detection in Power Utility Real-Time Ethernet Communications by Kabir-Querrec, Maëlle et al.
Corrupted GOOSE Detectors: Anomaly Detection in
Power Utility Real-Time Ethernet Communications
Mae¨lle Kabir-Querrec, Ste´phane Mocanu, Pascal Bellemain, Jean-Marc
Thiriet, Eric Savary
To cite this version:
Mae¨lle Kabir-Querrec, Ste´phane Mocanu, Pascal Bellemain, Jean-Marc Thiriet, Eric Savary.
Corrupted GOOSE Detectors: Anomaly Detection in Power Utility Real-Time Ethernet Com-
munications. GreHack 2015, Nov 2015, Grenoble, France. <hal-01237725>
HAL Id: hal-01237725
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01237725
Submitted on 3 Dec 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Corrupted GOOSE Detectors: Anomaly 
Detection in Power Utility Real-Time 
Ethernet Communications 
Maëlle Kabir-Querrec1,2, Stéphane Mocanu1, Pascal  Bellemain1,  Jean-Marc Thiriet1, 
Eric Savary2 
 
1 Univ. Grenoble Alpes, GIPSA-lab, F-38000 Grenoble, France 
2 Euro-System, F-38760 Varces, France 
 
Abstract: GOOSE protocol is used for critical protection operations in the power 
grid, as standardized by IEC61850. It thus has strong real-time constraints that make 
very hard to implement any security means for integrity and confidentiality such as 
encryption or signature. Our answer to this lack of dedicated cybersecurity measures 
is to check legitimacy of every GOOSE messages flowing over the managed network. 
When detectors issue an alert, the SCADA informs field devices to discard GOOSE 
communication and run an alternative protection strategy. This article focuses on the 
GOOSE attack detectors we developed: one dedicated to Ethernet storm and the other 
one to fraudulent GOOSE frames. The paper first introduces main GOOSE protocol 
mechanisms and gives a brief state of the art regarding GOOSE attack management 
before presenting our architecture and the detectors. 
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1. Introduction 
When speaking of power grid protection, two goals usually compete with each 
other. Service availability is of the highest priority so in case of an electrical flaw 
there must be as few devices to disconnect as possible. In parallel there is a concern 
for system components: damages caused by short circuits grow more serious as the 
current is high and the fault persists a long time. Selectivity is the fact that the 
protection system will minimize the effect of an electrical fault on the power system 
while keeping the portion of the grid to shut down to a minimum. 
In an IEC61850 substation, selectivity uses point-to-point real-time communication 
between the protective relays (the IED – Intelligent Electronic Devices) to fulfill 
protection operations. This communication runs the GOOSE protocol (Generic Object 
Oriented System Event). 
What if these GOOSE messages, critical to the grid protection, cannot be trusted 
anymore? The IEC61850 standard introducing the GOOSE protocol does not propose 
any cybersecurity measures. Our approach is then to design an architecture 
monitoring corrupted GOOSE, either accidentally or maliciously, and let the system 
run in a “safe” mode regarding communications. This architecture described in [1] 
relies on two detectors responsible for verifying the state of the real-time Ethernet-
based communication network. This article focuses on these two detectors while the 
purpose of [1] is to present the whole architecture and the GOOSE-independent 
strategy for completing the protection function in a “safe” mode. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 is a brief presentation of the 
IEC61850 GOOSE communication mechanisms, then comes section 3 about the 
proposed detectors - bandwidth usage checker and GOOSE frame verifier, section 4 
concludes the paper. 
2. GOOSE – Generic Object Oriented System Event 
As said in the introduction, GOOSE communication is used for real-time infor-
mation transfer between IEDs, the “actuators” performing electrical protection opera-
tions. Considering the strong time constraints and criticality of the transferred infor-
mation, GOOSE messages flow over a network dedicated to horizontal communica-
tion: only IEDs should be connected to it and GOOSE should be the sole protocol 
running over it. 
2.1 GOOSE frame 
GOOSE protocol is mapped on the Ethernet link layer. Messages are then sent as 
multicast frames following a publisher-subscriber procedure: devices on the network 
“see” all messages but read only the ones they are interested in, meaning the GOOSE 
messages they are subscribed to. 
GOOSE frame structure is standardized (ISO/IEC8802-3 Ethertype 0x88b8) and 
given in the IEC61850. It has been the subject of some papers such as [2]. The 
GOOSE APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit) contains the data sent by the 
transmitting application. It is specified in ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation One) as a 
set of 12 items (detailed in the right part of figure 1). 
Let us highlight that “security” field use is not explained in the standard. Security 
measures are indeed recommended by the IEC61850 standard but their 
implementation is up to the IED vendors. 
Some of these fields (those whose names are underlined) can be exploited to check 
the message conformance with the system configuration. 
 Fig.1. Structure of GOOSE frame (from IEC61850-8.1) 
2.2 Transmission mechanism 
In a publisher-subscriber messaging procedure, there is no acknowledgment for 
received messages. To ensure reliability, GOOSE protocol has a specific transmission 
scheme as shown in figure 2. When an event occurs resulting in some change in one 
or more variables whose values are transmitted by the GOOSE message, a message is 
generated while StNum is incremented and SqNum is reset to 0. This GOOSE 
message is sent periodically at a high frequency T1 first and then at slower 
frequencies T2 and T3 until the frequency T0 for stable conditions. 
 Fig. 2. GOOSE transmission 
2.3 Attacks 
We consider two types of Ethernet attacks which are mentioned in the literature 
[3]. The first type of incident we consider is Ethernet storm. It was because of such an 
incident that an American nuclear plant was shut down in an emergency state [4]. The 
second attack is the publication of fraudulent GOOSE messages, mistakenly 
interpreted as valid by subscribers [5]. As shown in [5], an attacker just needs an 
access point to the network to launch a GOOSE message spoof attack. Attacks 
described in [6], [7] and [5] capture GOOSE messages flowing on the network, 
modify them before re-injecting them into the network to gain access and control of 
the IEDs. In the second paper, attack is automated using a script and code is available 
online to use as a basis for our experiments [8]. After some adaptations, these Python 
scripts let us decode and encode GOOSE PDUs. 
IEDs available on the market today do not implement any security mean for 
GOOSE communication: no encryption, no digital signature because used 
technologies for these industrial gears still cannot perform such security computing 
while respecting the strong real-time requirements (4ms end-to-end transfer time). 
3. Corrupted GOOSE detectors 
3.1 Related works 
The literature gives many interesting articles about anomaly and intrusion detection 
in SCADA communication systems [9, 10, 11]. Regarding IEC61850 environments, 
there are only a few publications among which it is worth mentioning [12] and [7]. 
The IDS (Intrusion Detection System) proposed in [12] uses an open-source 
detection software, Snort, specifying rules enumerating badness. It does not deal with 
GOOSE communication though, but rules mostly check signatures of known attacks 
on ARP and ICMP traffic. A stand-alone implementation was chosen because authors 
consider that IEDs do not have computational capabilities to host an IDS. 
The work proposed in [7] is more closely related to our approach. The 
specification-based IDS presented in [7] is dedicated to IEC61850 real-time 
communications, meaning GOOSE and SV (Sampled Values, protocol used by field 
merging units to send process measures to IEDs). However learning phase from 
trustable collected data is required to train some of the rules while we want to avoid 
such a phase and generate our rules using only IEC61850 standard specifications and 
configuration files. For their testbed, authors made the choice of a unique network 
while recommendation is to have physically separated networks dedicated to their 
own purpose, especially a network dedicated to horizontal real-time connections 
between IEDs. Moreover Hong et al. have not made their C code available. 
The two cyber incidents we consider in the present work are fraudulent GOOSE 
messages and Ethernet storm. We found no mention of detection of Ethernet storm in 
IEC61850 real-time environment in the literature. 
3.2 Communication architecture 
The proposed communication architecture is presented in figure 3. It is composed 
of three separated communication networks:  
• A network for vertical flows between SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition) and IEDs, 
• A real-time network dedicated to GOOSE messages between IEDs, 
• A Modbus/TCP network for the supervision to get reports and alarms from the 
detectors. 
For this work, vertical communication between supervision and IEDs is supposed 
reliable. Indeed, this part of the architecture is out of the scope of this work which 
focuses on detecting fraudulent GOOSE communications. 
The detectors send their analysis results to the SCADA over Modbus/TCP using 
two different mechanisms. Supervision periodically gets analysis results of the 
bandwidth checker through polling. To reduce propagation delay of an alert in case of 
a false GOOSE detection, the GOOSE frame verifier is associated to a Modbus/TCP 
client while the supervision is configured as a server. 
 
The supervision forwards alarms to the IEDs when a threat is identified. In normal 
mode, when an IED received a GOOSE frame, it waits for an alert from SCADA. If it 
has not come after detection time has expired then it takes into account the transferred 
information and launches the required actions. This is possible because electrical 
protection functions operate in 100ms to 1s while GOOSE end-to-end transfer time 
must be of less than 4ms. 
When IEDs are informed of a cyber-threat they enter a safe mode: an alternative 
strategy takes over the real-time communication relying on specific programs and the 
communication with the SCADA. When alarm is deactivated, IEDs are back to 
normal mode. This alternative strategy is detailed in [1]. 
  
Fig. 3. Communication architecture 
 
3.3 Bandwidth usage checker 
From a Linux bandwidth monitor, ifstat, we created a sensor to measure 
instantaneous and average bandwidth use; duration can be configured by the user. 
Here is the algorithm of the ifstat-based Ethernet bandwidth checker: 
Algorithm of the Ethernet storm detector 
 
3.4 GOOSE frame verifier 
Detecting false GOOSE messages is more challenging. As presented in [5], an 
attacker sends a quick sequence of GOOSE messages (with a false state change on the 
publisher side) which have correct sequence and state numbers and timestamps 
regarding the previous legitimate frames. Figure 4 is a timeline of such an attack. 
Start ifstat in Modbus server mode 
Initialize Modbus server 
Wait for client connections 
While (ifstat runs) 
While (Client_Connection_Counter < Configured_Window) 
Mean_Bandwidth += Number_of_IN_Frames_Since_Last_Connection / 
Configured_Window 
Reset Client_Connection_Counter 
 Fig. 4. Legitimate (full line) and false (dotted line) events in GOOSE sequence 
 
A GOOSE attack can be detected by comparison of the sequence and state 
numbers from two consecutive messages. Even a perfect attack is detected after T0 at 
the latest, when the first true GOOSE message highlights incoherent counters or 
clock. 
Our GOOSE frame verifier is based on tcpdump, an open-source packet analyzer. 
From all the frames captured by libpcap functions, only GOOSE messages are kept 
(Ethertype 0x88b8). For every GOOSE, the analyzer checks: 
•  that the intercepted GOOSE is defined in the system configuration; 
•  that SqNum and StNum counters are relevant compared to previous 
messages of same GOOSE Identifier (see 2.1); 
•  that timestamp is coherent regarding the previous messages of same GoID 
and the counters (SqNum, StNum). 
Algorithm of the GOOSE frame verifier 
 
4. Conclusion 
In an IEC61850 power grid, critical protection and control functions rely on real-
time GOOSE messages. Today gears are not able to support any security measures for 
real-time communication and GOOSE protocol may be considered vulnerable to 
cyber incidents and attacks. To leverage the trust in the automation system, we 
Start tcpdump in Modbus server mode 
Initialize Modbus server 
While (tcpdump runs) 
 Get captured GOOSE message 
 Get RxTime 
 Get GOOSE PDU fields and store them 
 Check Source_Address 
Check GoID 
Check StNum and SqNum compared to previous same-GoID GOOSE 
Check RxTime compared to previous same-GoID GOOSE 
developed two detectors in charge of checking the Ethernet bandwidth keeps an 
acceptable value and of verifying GOOSE messages are not corrupted. In this paper 
we presented these detectors. The whole architecture we proposed has not been 
detailed here but in [1].  
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